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SHIFTING SCIENCE, CONSIDERED COSTS, AND STATIC STATUTES: THE INTERPRETATION OF EXPANSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Jason J. Czarnezki* Congress often passes expansive legislation, frequently environmental and public health regulatory statutes, where both the definition of those items being regulated and the mandate have significant breadth. How should these provisions be construed? While it is difficult to establish a model which determines whether to broadly or narrowly construe an expansive statutory provision, factors that impact this choice include the existence of express limitations on the mandate, understandings of congressional intent, the need to avoid regulation that might do more harm than good, the nature of the regulated item, and intervening circumstances such as new understandings in law, policy, or science. This Article sets out to establish how, why, and when courts should broadly interpret expansive environmental and public health legislation. Absent express limitations requiring cost-benefit analysis or technological feasibility, courts should broadly construe expansive environmental legislation. Why? Courts are equipped to interpret the textual mandate, the costs of a failure to regulate, even in an interim period, are potentially great, and Congress, in recognition of changed circumstances, was aware of the breadth of the textual language; whereas courts should allow administrative agencies to narrowly or broadly construe statutory provisions with such limitations subject to Chevron deference. Expansive definitions and mandates fill federal environmental and public health statutes-administrative agencies must create standards for "air pollutant emissions" that "endanger public health or welfare,"' keep workplaces free from "hazards" that "are likely to cause death or serious physical harm, ' "2 and develop "drinking water regulation" for any contaminant that "may have an adverse effect on the health of persons." 3 In evaluating the action or inaction of administrative agencies pursuant to these provisions, judges must often choose between broad or narrow construction. Statutes are often narrowly construed, as a result of lawful and unlawful agency action, 4 but frequently statutes contain provisions that limit any attempt at broad construction (e.g., requiring that costs be considered). 5 Nevertheless, courts and agencies become anxious when interpreting expansive environmental statutory mandates, and this nervousness leads to narrowness of, ironically, textually broad statutory language. It is difficult to establish a model to determine whether to broadly or narrowly construe an expansive federal statutory provision that delegates authority to an administrative agency to protect environmental and public health. However, factors that impact this choice include the existence of express limitations on the mandate, understandings of congressional intent, the need to avoid regulation that might do more harm than good, the nature of the regulated item or substance, and intervening circumstances such as new understandings in law, policy, or science.
The choice between broad versus narrow construction not only affects the singular provision at issue, but also implicitly affects the institutional relationships between Congress, administrative agencies, and the judiciary in the environmental context. 6 Absent express limitations requiring cost-benefit analysis or technological feasibility, courts should broadly construe expansive environmental legislation. Why? Courts are equipped to interpret the textual mandate, the costs of a failure to regulate, even in an interim period, are potentially great, and Congress, in recognition of changed circumstances, was aware of the breadth of the textual language; whereas courts should allow administrative agencies to narrowly or broadly construe statutory provisions with such limitations subject to Chevron deference. 7 As a result, the judiciary will not create irreparable environmental and public health harm due to insufficient regulation. Moreover, Congress can still choose not to regulate, through later statutory action, and agencies, through standard-setting, can create appropriate, even if minimal, standards. Thus, broad interpretation of expansive legislation without limitations makes good sense where Congress has delegated authority to an administrative agency to protect public health and the environment, and significant harm might accrue between the time of narrow judicial interpretation and any legislative or administrative agency action.
This Article, limited to the environmental law context, sets out to establish how, why, and when courts should broadly interpret Rijv. 885, 927 (2003) .
7 Chevron, U.S. A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (requiring courts to give deference to an agency's statutory interpretations when the statute is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is reasonable). It would also be reasonable to characterize the suggested level of deference as not subject to Chevron step two, but instead as a judicial interpretation of a clear statute under Chevron step one authorizing an expert agency to balance a variety of considerations (i.e., limitations), subject to hard look review. expansive environmental and public health legislation, focusing on whether broad statutory construction should be an interpretive principle in at least some instances. Part II of this Article recognizes Congress's affinity for broad statutory provisions in environmental law, analyzes statutes containing expansive definitions and mandates, and suggests what characteristics are required to broadly construe expansive legislation in changing scientific circumstances. Part III confronts the conflict between scientific advances and the law, argues that expansive legislation, when directed at environmental or public health, must be broadly construed, and evaluates the institutional consequences for such a view of statutory interpretation. Part IV suggests judicial limitations when broadly interpreting expansive statutory provisions. The Article concludes by evaluating the consequences of a broad, yet text-based, interpretive approach to environmental legislation.
II. INTERPRETING EXPANSIVE LEGISLATION
Congress often passes expansive legislation, frequently regulatory environmental and public health statutes, where both the definition of the items being regulated and the mandate have significant breadth. 8 How should these provisions be construed when the statute contains no specific listing of what can be subject to the regulation or what factors should be considered in meeting the statutory mandate?
While Congress could create a discrete list of substances to regulate and circumstances under which to regulate, it rarely does the former 9 and does not do the latter as frequently as it could. This is not a criticism, for Congress likely is aware that new scientific discoveries will often alter any regulatory scheme. Legislative inefficiency would result if statutes required amendment every time, for example, a new pollutant was discovered. Thus, the judiciary and administrative agencies have the balance of power in interpreting expansive legislation.' 0 Focusing on examples in the environmen- 9 Congress often creates an initial list of pollutants, but this list can be revised. See, e.g., CAA § § 112(b)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000) (initial list of hazardous air pollutants which must be periodically revised).
10 Cf. Farina, supra note 6, at 452-53 ("For those who study the interaction of courts and agencies, one of the most persistently intriguing puzzles has been to define the appropriate judicial and administrative roles in the interpretation of regulatory statutes."). Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (giving deference to an agency's statutory interpretations tal law context, this Part discusses, first, expansive legislation that contains guidance limiting broad interpretation and, second, expansive provisions without any such limitations.
A. Expansive Statutes with Limitations
Expansive statutes are synonymous with public and environmental health legislation seeking to mitigate the imposition of negative externalities on human welfare. In light of their scope, Congress often limits broad interpretation of the statutory mandates by including provisions that restrict how the statutory mandate must be implemented. Thus, while a statute authorizes agency regulation of a substance that endangers human health, that substance may only be regulated after costs are considered, using existing technology, or if feasible.
Two environmental and public health statutes, the Safe Drinking Water Act' ("SDWA") and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act' 2 ("FIFRA"), are illustrative. The SDWA protects public health by regulating naturally-occurring and man-made contaminants in the nation's drinking water supply.' 3 The SDWA requires promulgation of standards including maximum contaminant level goals ("MCLGs") and maximum contaminant levels ("MCLs").
1 4 As the term "goal" would suggest, the MCLGs are aspirational, and are set at levels "at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur which allows for an adequate margin of safety. According to the D.C. Circuit in American Water Works, Congress "contemplated that an MCL would be a standard by which both the quality of the drinking water and the public water system's efforts to reduce the contaminant could be measured. ' 24 "[A]n MCL for lead would be neither" because regulation would not be feasible in light of where the contamination arose, and because compliance with a lead MCL might increase other contaminant levels as a result of adding anti-corrosion chemicals to the water supply. 25 Hence, the SDWA is a statute which specifies limitations, cost-benefit analysis (allowed) and feasibility (required), on the aggressive statutory mandate. These limitations require expert balancing by the administrative agency, and courts do, and should, defer to agency interpretations of statutory provisions requiring cost-benefit analysis, feasibility, or reasonableness. The D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's definition of "feasible" in American Water Works under the Chevron doctrine. 26
18 The EPA administers the SDWA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300f (7)- (8) (1996) .
19 42 U.S.C. § 300f(l)(C)(i) (1996) . [Vol. 24:395 Similar to the statutory mandate in the SDWA, FIFRA regulates pesticides "to the extent necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,"27 where "environment" includes "water, air, land, and all plants and man and other animals living therein and the interrelationships which exist among these. '28 Because it is hard to imagine that a pesticide would not have some "adverse effect" on the ecosystem, the effect must be "unreasonable"-a word usually connoting that some sort of balancing must commence. Under FIFRA, the EPA must "tak[e] into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of the pesticide. '29 No doubt that, in many instances, a zero pollutant or contaminant goal is both unattainable and unwise because negative externalities accompany nearly all beneficial products or consumer goods. But in some cases, a maximum pollutant level is absolutely necessary regardless of costs or available technology-if a safe level is unattainable, sometimes a complete ban may even be necessary. Statutes can inform the administrative agencies whether to balance interests, like FIFRA or SDWA, or can inform the courts to broadly interpret statutory mandates without such limitations.
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directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."). However, courts should be reluctant, absent such limitations, to narrowly construe statutory provisions or defer to the regulating agency. For further discussion of the role of courts versus agencies in interpreting expansive environmental legislation, see infra Part Ill.
27 FIFRA § 3(a), 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1996) . 28 FIFRA § 2(j), 7 U.S.C. § 1360) (1996) . 29 FIFRA § 2(bb), 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1996) .
30 This is not to say that courts have not exerted their authority to define the steps of the decision-making process under the relevant statute. See generally Indus. Union Dept. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting TSCA). Nevertheless, agencies may be in a better position to determine how to best engage in complex analyses, while courts must ensure that such steps are consistent with the statutory text and recognize that agency deference is appropriate where the steps are subject to a number of reasonable interpreta- 
B. Expansive Statutes without Limitations
In construing expansive legislation without express limitations," the judiciary must determine (1) whether the statute allows for consideration of certain criteria when regulating, and (2) whether the statute requires or allows a federal agency to assert its jurisdiction at all.
The voluminous Clean Air Act ("CAA") is a prime example of expansive legislation raising the first issue. While containing numerous ambitious mandates, Congress chose, in some instances, not to include express limitations on how to achieve the CAA's goals. Under section 108 of the CAA, the EPA, for the purpose of creating national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") under section 109,32 must list air pollutant emissions "which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. ' (2000) (creating an emissions standard "which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.").
37 CAA § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2000) ("Emissions standards promulgated under this subsection and applicable to new or existing sources of hazardous air pollutants shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants subject to this section (including a prohibition on such emissions, where achievable) that the Administrator, taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements, determines is achievable.").
ation v. Whitman, 38 upheld the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that "economic considerations [may] play no part in the promulgation of ambient air quality standards" ' 39 because " [n] owhere are the costs of achieving such a standard made part of that initial calculation. 4 The CAA's mandate is a blank check to create NAAQS "allowing an adequate margin of safety '41 so long as the standard "accurately reflect[s] the latest scientific knowledge" in determining the effects on public health. 42 In addition to determining what an agency must consider when regulating, it is the quintessential judicial function to determine if the agency has the jurisdiction to regulate or must regulate at all. For example, in Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC, the Supreme Court questioned whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers maintained jurisdiction to regulate the discharge of fill in certain types of wetlands under the Clean Water Act. 43 In defining the scope of protection of the nation's waterways, courts have looked at the statutory text, 44 determining whether wetlands are "waters of the United States. '4 5 Science often permeates these jurisdictional decisions-Is the wetland connected to a traditionally navigable waterway? Is the connection direct, or via indirect or seasonal water flow? Does the wetland flow to a river through an underwater hydrological connection?
Expansive regulatory legislation designed to protect the public health and the environment must rely on scientific expertise in order to know what to regulate now and what to regulate in the future, including pollutants and areas of protection not contemplated at the time of the enactment. For example, air quality criteria existed for only six pollutants in 1971, and while "some uncertainty about health effects of air pollution is inevitable," the EPA properly added lead as a seventh criteria air pollutant. 4 6 Also, advances in scientific knowledge might suggest that discharges into isolated wetlands connected to traditionally navigable waterways through underground hydrologic channels have a far greater impact on water quality than previously envisioned. 47 Similarly, scientific and medical knowledge about the dangers of tobacco and nicotine has grown over the past fifty years. 48 As a result, science must play an unusual role in expansive legislation without express limitations that determine the scope of agency jurisdiction because the baseline scientific findings may be disputed. As science progresses, the chances decrease that Congress would have contemplated regulation of the harmful substance at issue (e.g., tobacco or greenhouse gases or wetlands fill).
In interpreting expansive legislation, the choice is between a static 49 (what was contemplated at the time of enactment) or dynamic interpretation 50 (interpretation in light of changed circum-46 See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 EPA, 647 F.2d , 1154 EPA, 647 F.2d , 1184 EPA, 647 F.2d (1980 . Sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants were regulated at the time the CAA was enacted. Nitrogen oxides were added in 1971. Rointwr V. 50 (1994) ("Especially over time, the circumstances will not be ones that the statute or the drafters contemplated, and any application of the statute will be dynamic in a weak sense, going [Vol. 24:395 stances such as new law or new scientific understanding and discovery).' The choice is not difficult when lower courts must simply follow an intervening ruling of the Supreme Court. 5 2 Often, however, the choice is not so clear, for example, when despite the understanding at the time of enactment, horizontal persuasive precedent has developed 53 or when scientific understanding has shifted to the point where the statutory meaning would not have conformed with the expectations of the original drafters and legislators who passed the statute. 5 4 But absent textual limitations, how broadly should judges interpret expansive environmental legislation, especially in those instances when intervening scientific knowledge might favor a broader construction?
We can assess this query by way of a more detailed exampledid Congress know that greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide, might be regulated under the CAA? Perhaps so; perhaps not-"the legislative history contains a few stray references to humanforced climate change. ' Ri:v. 405, 493-97 (1989) (discussing statutory interpretation in light of changed circumstances or obsolescence).
51 Admittedly, this is a false dichotomy when Congress envisioned at the time of enactment that the statute's regulatory scope would increase over time.
52 Cf Strauss, supra note 50, at I (questioning whether textual meaning can be shaped by subsequent events such as "intervening judicial decisions").
53 By horizontal persuasive precedent, I refer to a common understanding and meaning established by the legal profession and lower courts. See id. at 2 (arguing that, in the context of the APA, the Supreme Court "should accord substantial weight to contemporary consensus the profession and lower courts have been able to develop in interpreting law").
54 Pursuant to section 202(1) of the CAA, part of the 1990 Amendments, the Act requires the EPA to set standards to control hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles. In 2001, EPA listed MBTE as a mobile source hazardous air pollutant. Control of Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,229, 17,235 (Mar. 29, 2001 ) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 80, 86). (MTBE has also been banned by a number of states based on the concern that it enters underground drinking water supplies.) However, MBTE had been used since 1979 as an octane enhancer, and used, beginning in 1992, at higher concentrations in some gasoline to fulfill the Act's oxygenate requirements. Thus, Congress might not have "expected" MBTE, at the time of passage or in 2001, to be regulated as a hazardous air pollutant. relevant where Congress seeks to mitigate public harm via expansive statutes that intrinsically provide for the addition of items to be regulated, as is the case here. 56 "The fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth. ' 57 Thus, courts should rely on the statutory text (i.e., permit jurisdiction and mandate regulation under the plain meaning of the text pursuant to Chevron step one).
In the greenhouse gas context, the issue is not only whether the agency has the jurisdiction to regulate, 58 but also whether the agency is required to do so. The federal government has not mitigated carbon dioxide emissions 5 9 under the Clean Air Act despite the ambitious plain language of the text. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's decision that the agency should not regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under the CAA. 6 1 In dissent, D.C. Circuit Judge Tatel argued that greenhouse gases "plainly fall within the meaning" of air pollutants to be regulated under the Act. 6 ' Tatel continued, stating that if the EPA administrator finds that the gases contribute to air pollution that puts the public's health in danger, "then EPA has authority-56 While fact-specific intent may not be relevant (i.e., intent as to whether to regulate a specific item), intent may be relevant to the extent that Congress was unsure what science will show in the future, but nevertheless wanted to delegate authority to regulate. See, e.g., CAA § 169A(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (a)(1) (2000) ("Congress hereby declares as a national goal the prevention of any future, and the remedying of any existing, impairment of visibility in mandatory class I Federal areas which impairment results from manmade air pollution.") (emphasis added); COMM. ON ENVIRONMINT AND PUBLIC WORKS, U.S. S;NATIi, 10313 CONG., LiXiISI.ArIV HisiORY 01 "'1n11 CIiAN Aji Acr AMFNIMINTS OF 1990, at 980 (1993) (Senator Baucus introducing report entitled Clean Air Act Amendment Costs and Economic Effects: A Review of Published Studies) ("It is appropriate, particularly in a wealthy society, that the public be protected from the unseen and unknown hazards which can result from exposure to certain air pollutants."); Id. at 2898. (quoting Representative Wolpe) ("There are some toxic pollutants whose true risks are still unknown. We must ensure that as future risks become known they are properly regulated. These air toxics provisions will help give us these assurances.").
57 PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001) Apr. 18, 2006) .
64 In other words, the court need not find the statute to be ambiguous under Chevron step one. This is the case despite the "in his judgment language" of section 202 of the CAA. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976), with Judge Tatel's dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 79-80 ("The statutory standard, moreover, is precautionary. At the time we decided Ethyl, section 202(a)(1) and similar CAA provisions either authorized or required the Administrator to act on finding that emissions led to 'air pollution which endangers the public health or welfare.' After Ethyl found that 'the statutes and common sense demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable,' the 1977 Congress not only approved of this conclusion, but also wrote it into the CAA. Section 202(a)(1) (along with other provisions) now requires regulation to precede certainty. It requires regulation where, in the Administrator's judgment, emissions 'contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.' As the House Report explained: 'In order to emphasize the precautionary or preventative purpose of the act (and, therefore, the Administrator's duty to assess risks rather than wait for proof of actual harm), the committee not only retained the concept of endangerment to health; the committee also added the words 'may reasonably be anticipated to."') (internal citations omitted). See also Sunstein, supra note 50, at 465 (arguing that such words allow "discretion to decide on the tolerance definite harm is not required, only a finding that endangerment can be reasonably anticipated. 6 5 As a result, courts should interpret the language broadly, permitting and requiring regulation, regardless of whether an agency has made the decision to regulate (e.g., wetlands fill or tobacco) or has decided not to (e.g., greenhouse gases). Agencies should decide whether a substance should be regulated only if textual limitations exist requiring sophisticated costbenefit balancing or cost considerations or technological feasibility, and agencies should receive deference and must face political realities when deciding where, not if (absent express limitations), to put the level or standard of regulation (e.g., what level is "requisite to protect the public health" "allowing for an adequate margin of safety").
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level but do not confer on him discretion not to promulgate regulations at all."). Broad construction of statutory provisions where the purpose is to prevent harm to human health may also apply beyond environmental statutes, see, e.g., OSHA § 5, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2000), and outside the context of administrative agencies where changed scientific circumstances may play less of a role. I encourage other scholars to assess the appropriateness of this Article's broad interpretive principle to other areas of law, especially where a statute is remedial in nature and seeks to avert harm to human welfare (e.g., health law, employment discrimination). For example, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA") requires that hospitals with an open emergency room provide assessment and treatment to stabilize a person who presents themselves there, regardless of payment sources. 42 U.S.C. § § 1395dd(a), (h) (2000) . While science and technology clearly improve over time in the medical profession, hospitals are under no obligation to employ new technology to comply with EMTALA. Hospitals must only do the best they can with available resources. If someone arrives at an emergency room who is so ill or traumatized that he or she cannot be stabilized, the hospital is left with the cost using the resources available. Id.
§ 1395dd(b)(1). 
III. A BROAD INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLE
Law and science have had a troubled marriage. Good science can generate consensus in a discipline, but science is rarely dispositive. 67 Yet, while the law seeks certainty, 68 Congress must pass expansive legislation to account for changes over time. 69 Courts may be able to evaluate scientific consensus (e.g., does global warming exist?), but administrative agencies might be better left with the details (e.g., what are the proper regulatory standards and requirements for compliance in order to mitigate greenhouse gas production?). Even so, difficult science makes for difficulty in creating law. 7° It is difficult for a judge to be a "faithful servant' when faced with expansive legislation, especially in light of new scientific discoveries. However, for those environmental statutes with expansive mandates seeking to prevent public harms (without any limitations on how the harm should be regulated), judges are being faithful servants by broadly construing the mandates and requiring regulation by the prescribed agency.
Proper interpretation of expansive environmental legislation requires confidence that such an interpretation conforms with the appropriate institutional relationships that Congress (and the Constitution) envisioned between the judiciary and administrative agencies. 72 On the one hand, " [t] o determine 'what the law is' in the context of an actual controversy that turns on a question of statutory meaning is the quintessential judicial function. At the same time, however, such questions are so bound up with successful administration of the regulatory scheme that it may seem only sensible to give principal interpretive responsibility to the 'expert' agency that lives with the statute constantly. ' broadly or narrowly, subject to Chevron deference strikes the proper balance. Rarely should courts narrowly construe expansive provisions that contain no express limitations, 74 but the scope of this broad interpretive principle is not infinite as discussed in infra Part IV.
Chevron deference is appropriate where agency expertise is required. 5 In some instances, "Congress both perceives the need for future interpretation and formulates an intent that it be accomplished by the agency." 76 However, "in Chevron itself the Supreme Court faced a question of how -and not whether -the CAA applied to certain sources of air emissions. ' 77 Thus courts decide "whether" regulation is required, not "how." Agencies can only construe "whether" when explicit limitations exist, and otherwise determine "how." Instances appropriate for agency construction are evidenced by express limitations requiring cost-benefit balancing or deciding technological feasibility. In other words, Congress has expressed an explicit textual desire for additional expert con-74 Arguably, narrow construction of expansive legislation might be perceived as a sort of information-forcing default where Congress will be forced to act if it chooses to regulate.
Cf Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YAii L.J. 87, 127-28 (1989) ("When parties fail to contract because they want to shift the ex ante transaction cost to a subsidized ex post court determination, a penalty default of non-enforcement may be appropriate. When strategic considerations cause a more knowledgeable party not to raise issues that could improve contractual efficiency, a default that penalizes the more informed party may encourage the revelation of information."). See also infra Part IV.A. However, broad interpretation means that the judiciary will not create irreparable harm due to insufficient regulation, and Congress and agencies can later remedy any perceived judicial error through legislation or notice and comment rulemaking Thus, broad interpretation in some circumstances makes good sense where Congress has delegated authority to an administrative agency to protect public health and the environment, and significant harm might accrue between the time of narrow judicial interpretation and any legislative or administrative agency action. See, e.g, PI CiVAL, supra note 46, at 379 ("What OSHA left unsaid was that, due to judicial intervention [by narrowly construing the Occupational Safety and Health Act in The Benzene Case], it had taken ten years to lower the benzene [permissible exposure limit] to the very levels the Agency had sought to adopt on an emergency basis in May 1977."). In addition, broad construction can also act as an information forcing device to promote political accountability and Congressional action. For example, the Food Quality Protection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321, was passed following the Ninth Circuit's expansive interpretation of the Delaney Clause in Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992 siderations in order to determine the scope of the statutory mandate. Absent such an expression, judges, not bureaucrats or technocrats, must define the scope of the expansive statutory provision.
To allow deference to agencies for all types of expansive legislation would weaken judicial control over administrative agencies in derogation of Congress's "meta-intent" and the judiciary's responsibility to determine the lawful limits of government action." 8 If Congress desires administrative deference, it must provide the agencies with principles and considerations (which this Article calls "limitations") by which to construe an otherwise expansive statutory mandate. 7 9 Such limitations may be worthwhile because, for example, "the economic cost of implementing a very stringent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health gains achieved in cleaning the air-for example, by closing down whole industries and thereby impoverishing workers and consumers dependent upon those industries." 8 0 This conclusion does not subvert the advantage of political accountability in Chevron deference; 8 " for policy considerations inevitably play a role in setting any health-based standard. Initially, a broad interpretive principle by the judiciary prevents courts and agencies from prohibiting any regulation of an item which falls under the expansive textual mandate; such prohibition might have great costs if harms occur in the time between judicial decision and any subsequent curative congressional or administrative action. Following an initial broad judicial interpretation, agencies would be forced to engage in deliberative and technocratic processes (e.g., notice and comment rulemaking) to determine the proper scope of environmental regulation. 78 Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. Rjiv. 271,287-92 (1986) ; Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. Ri:v. 353, 367-71 (1987 837, 865-66 (1984) ("In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.").
Absent express limitations, courts should only be concerned with expanding what should be regulated in light of changed circumstances. Thus, courts should also take great care not to fashion implicit default rules, such as allowing cost considerations not explicitly required by Congress, when agencies implement statutory provisions.
8 " In Michigan v. EPA, 8 3 the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the statutory meaning of "contribute significantly" under the State Implementation Plan ("SIP") provision of the CAA allowed for cost considerations.8 4 A SIP must contain a program that prevents "emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will contribute significantly to nonattainment in ... any other state" with respect to the NAAQS. 85 The "contribute significantly" language in the SIP provision is similar to "protect public health, ' 8 6 a phrase which seems "to refer to environmental damage, not to environmental damage measured in light of cost." 8 7
When faced with this expansive provision, the court evaluated whether to allow cost considerations or to enforce an expansive precautionary mandate. 8 Here the court decided that there is sensibly decide whether a risk is 'significant' without also examining the cost of eliminating it?").
85 CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(l) (2000) . 86 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 677 ("The fundamental dispute is over the clarity of the phrase 'contribute significantly.' Must EPA simply pick some flat 'amount' of contribution, based exclusively on health concerns, such that any excess would put a state in the forbidden zone of 'significance'? Or was it permissible for EPA to consider differences in cutback costs, so that, after reduction of all that could be cost-effectively eliminated, any remaining 'contribution' would not be considered 'significant'? In deciding on the permissible ceiling, EPA used 'significant' in the second way.").
87 Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 Mi('ii. L. Ri:v. 1651 , 1678 (2001 . 88 Enforcing an expansive precautionary mandate, absent judicially-created default rules, is, in my view, the only way to interpret these statutes consistently across cases and consistently with the statutory text. Contra The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 608 (upholding the "significant risk" requirement before regulating a toxic substance); Sunstein, supra note 50, at 491 ("The 'significant risk' requirement has no textual basis. .. But the conclusion in the case was nonetheless sound."). For a discussion of the difficulty in harmonizing The Benzene Case and Michigan v. EPA, see Sunstein, supra note 87, at 1678. But cost considerations in Michigan v. EPA should not be allowed on the same grounds as in Amer-"nothing in the text, structure, or history of § 110(a)(2)(D) [of the CAA] that bars EPA from considering cost in its application," ' 9 relying on D.C. Circuit precedent holding that "only where there is 'clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost' that we find agencies barred from considering costs." 90 However, between cost-benefit analysis and a precautionary mandate, the preference should be a legislative choice, and courts should hold Congress to their expansive and precautionary text. 91 Arguably this view is consistent with the view of both D.C. Circuit Judges Sentelle and Tatel. Sentelle, dissenting in Michigan v. EPA, and Tatel, dissenting in Massachusetts v. EPA, each assert that the respective expansive mandate at issue is clear under Chevron step one. 92 Thus, there was no reason to resort to D.C. Circuit precedent allowing cost consideration in the Michigan case, 9 3 and perhaps Judge Sentelle, had he not ruled on procedural standing grounds in the Massachusetts case, might agree with the substantive rationale in Tatel's dissent. 91 Contra Sunstein, supra note 87, at 1716 (arguing that in the face of silences or ambiguities we should permit cost-benefit balancing). But see id. at 1679 ("It is not clear whether the Supreme Court would approve the lower court's rejection of textualism...").
92 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 697 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("I see nothing in [Chevron] that either compels or counsels the majority's result. EPA argues that Congress did not define significant contribution. True, it did not. Neither did it define amount. But neither EPA nor the majority have offered any reasonable interpretation of those words which makes them depend upon or even relate to the cost effectiveness of alleviation .... Because the majority's deference to EPA's unreasonable statutory interpretation as couched in the agency's scurrilous 'second-step' cost effectiveness analysis ventures off track, as I said, I am getting off at the first stop."); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("'If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.' . . . This language [of CAA § 202(a)(1)] plainly authorizes regulation of (1) any air pollutants emitted from motor vehicles that (2) in the Administrator's judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9)).
93 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 695-97 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (1995) .
While cost-benefit analyses in environmental statutes, as a matter of policy, may be preferable to expansive mandates, 94 Congress must make this intent clear like it did in FIFRA. Some goods, like pesticides, may be a net benefit, despite environmental harms, and agencies are left to consider costs and engage in this calculus. At the same time, there may be advantages to expansive mandates without limitations. If we are deeply concerned with the risk of some public health dangers or aware that a substance can cause substantial harm but are uncertain of the probability of the harm occurring, no limitations may be appropriate regardless of costs. Expansive mandates without limitations and, in turn broad interpretation, also help to prevent public and environmental health policy choices from being co-opted by administrative agencies who might limit public protection possibly due to industrial lobbying or executive branch politics.
Thus, the proposed model this Article suggests may please both pragmatists (and other proponents of legislative history) and textualists. Justice Antonin Scalia, a self-proclaimed textualist, 95 Court's 2003-04 Term, 42 HoUs. L. Ri; v. 565, 572-605 (2005) . While some may disagree, I would argue that even originalists can embrace a broad interpretive principle because, absent express contrary statements, when Congress uses expansive language it may do so purposefully and with the knowledge that changing circumstances may affect regulatory expectations. L. Riv. 393, 395 (1996) .
98 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999) (opinion by Scalia, J.) ("The arguments recited in these sources have been soundly refuted, and the position for which they have been marshaled has been rejected by constitutional tradition and precedent as clear and conclusive, and almost as venerable, as that which consigns debate over whether Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided to forums more other-worldly than ours."). L. Riiv. 845, 847 (1994) .
should be pleased with deferring to administrative agencies where technocratic expertise is required. To summarize, judges should broadly interpret expansive environmental and public health legislation that seeks to limit public harms, without consideration of other factors. 61 (1993) (calling for creation of a health and environmental administrative agency that would be "mission oriented, seeking to bring a degree of uniformity and rationality to decision making in highly technical areas, with broad authority, somewhat independent, and with significant prestige").
102 I recognize that there are substantial policy consequences to embracing the broad interpretive principle suggested. For example, in the health case system, emergency rooms are already closing, often in the poorest neighborhoods; arguably expedited by broad EMTALA interpretations. Similarly, OSHA regulations may lead to fewer jobs, business losses, and loss of health care benefits. However, if Congress is concerned with these issues, the statutes should indicate whether these costs should be taken into consideration, allowing an agency to determine the proper scope of regulation. In other words, Congress should explicitly require cost-benefit analysis that focuses on the negative effect of the regulation (not the regulated harm itself) on public welfare.
103 See Chevron U.S. A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect."); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2005 ) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under Chevron step one, EPA clearly has the textual authority to regulate greenhouse gases), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 Ct. (2006 .
104 See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 445 ("An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of lawinterpreting power. Chevron confuses the two."); id. 
IV. THE SCOPE OF A BROAD INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLE
There are at least three circumstances in which expansive environmental legislation without limitations should not necessarily be read broadly. The first circumstance is where regulation was clearly not the intent of Congress at the time of the statute's enactment. This decision not to regulate must be clearly manifested by Congress, or the regulation must be so obviously outside the scope of what Congress likely envisioned, that no argument could be made that Congress would have approved its regulation at the time of enactment. The second circumstance is where broad construction would lead to an absurd result. Absurdity would have to be more than an unbalanced cost-benefit analysis, but instead a situation where regulating the harm at issue in the relevant statute would lead directly to the use of more harmful substances. The third circumstance is where the proposed interpretive principle that expansive legislation without express limitations should be broadly interpreted is limited to environmental and public health statutes regulating negative externalities.
First, when interpreting expansive textual language, what if a broad interpretation conflicts with congressional intent or longstanding practice? 1 0 7 In order to overrule this interpretive principle-that expansive legislation without express limitation be broadly interpreted by the courts-there must be clear congressional intent to do otherwise. The most noteworthy case addressing the issue of whether legislative action trumps the statutory text is FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation. 0 8 In 1996, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") attempted to regulate tobacco products, which contain nicotine, as "drugs" and "drug delivery devices" under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA").' 1 9 The court held that the FDCA, read in conjunction with Congress' subsequent tobacco-related legislation, did not give 120, 131-32 (2000) . 109 Id. at 127. The FDCA permits the FDA to regulate "drugs" ("articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body"), "device" ("an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance . . . or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is ... intended to affect the structure or any function of the body"), and "combination products" ("a combination of a drug, device, or biological product"). 21 U.S.C. § § 321(g)(1)(C), 321(h), 353(g)(1) (2004) . "The FDA has construed this provision as giving it the discretion to regulate combination products as drugs, as devices, or as both. " Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 130 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 44,400 (Aug. 28, 1996) and technological progress. 1 22 It is unconvincing that courts should hesitate to allow regulation in extraordinary cases 1 23 as scientific discoveries may often require major policy changes. 24 In other words, supposed reliance interests alone should not justify continuing (or, at a minimum, failing to regulate) a public health threat.
So the question properly phrased is whether Congress understood at the time of enactment that the FDCA did not allow the regulation of tobacco products regardless of the health effects. This question is a difficult one, and, maybe, as Brown & Williamson suggests, Congress would have said something if it wanted to allow tobacco regulation; but this is speculation. There must be an explicit statement that Congress does not want to regulate in light of an expansive statutory mandate and the possibility of changed circumstances. This conclusion forces reasoned Congressional action (i.e., Congress can insert limitations) and allows for broad mandates to protect public health and welfare.
Second, changed circumstances and science can cut both ways when statutory interpretation is seen as impacting the balancing of interests in making policy choices, especially in those attempts to improve the environment and public health-in some instances the text's scope arguably should be more limited (e.g., the Delaney Clause example discussed below) and in other cases should arguably be read more expansively (e.g., regulating tobacco products under the FDCA). In addition to clear congressional intent, another limitation on expanding definitional scope is that of absurdity. This absurdity exception should be defined narrowlywhere the result would be regulation that directly causes substantially more direct harm to human health than would otherwise be prevented. themselves have little or no beneficial value, and the costs of a failure to regulate are potentially high because significant harm may accrue in the time between narrow judicial construction of statutory provisions and any future congressional or administrative action.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts are both expected to say what the law is and to defer policy choices to better positioned administrative agencies. Yet too often, depending on the individual policy outcome, the interpretation of expansive environmental legislation is often inconsistentsometimes wanting textual strength; sometimes judicial policymaking.
30
Strong textual commitments, absent other interpretive tools, can lead to both over-and under-inclusive environmental regulation. Even so, courts should be wary of circumventing expansive statutory mandates. Instead courts should hold Congress to their expansive goals and only allow agency limitation of these goals when expressly provided by Congress.
Under this more consistent interpretive principle, greenhouse gases would be regulated under the Clean Air Act, wetlands fill would be subject to broad federal jurisdiction, and tobacco 31 would be subject to FDA regulation (unless timely legislative history is found), all under appropriate standards determined by agency expertise. At the same time, cancer-inducing food additives would be prohibited unless the substitutes would do substantially more harm, and judicially created cost-benefit default rules would disappear to be replaced by Congressional ones. At his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts stated, I depart from some views of original intent in the sense that those folks, some people view it as meaning just the conditions at the time, just the particular problem. I think you need to look at the words they used, and if the words adopt a broader principle, it applies more broadly. 32 Thus, courts should broadly construe expansive environmental and public health legislation because (1) judges are equipped to interpret the statutory mandate, (2) 
